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IN THE WAKE OF LOUGH v. BRUNSWICK CORP.: WHO
DECIDES EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSE IN 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) PUBLIC USE CASES?
Chad P. Webster
Abstract: Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a defendant can avoid liability for patent
infringement if the patented invention was in public use in the United States more than one
year prior to the date of patent application. Although "public use" is broadly construed to
include most nonsecret uses, a nonsecret use pursued primarily for bona fide experimental
purposes is merely an "experimental use." Experimental use negates the conclusion that an
invention was in public use within the meaning of section 102(b). In Lough v. Brunswick
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the issues of public use and
experimental use are questions of law. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit can decide whether a
particular invention was in public use or in experimental use without deference to a jury's
conclusion. This Note argues that, even if public use is properly classified as a question of
law, experimental use is a question of fact that should be reviewed under a deferential
standard. Because experimental use negates public use as a matter of law, a jury's conclusion
that an invention was not in public use should be upheld if substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that the disputed prior use was primarily for bona fide experimental purposes.
Every new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without the
intervention ofa jury... is a step towards establishing aristocracy,
the most oppressive of absolute governments.'
Sir William Blackstone
A valid patent grants the patentee an incorporeal property right2 to
exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing an invention for
a specified term.3 Issuance of a patent by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office is not, however, conclusive evidence of patent validity.4 Under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b), if an invention was in public use more than one year
prior to patent application, a patent issued for that invention will be
invalidated.5 Accordingly, prior public use under section 102(b) is a
defense6 to patent infringement.7
1. J.W. Ehrlich, Ehrlich 's Blackstone 683 (Nourse 1959).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
5. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 282(2) (1994).
6. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 282(2).
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The use of an invention without limitation, restriction, or injunction of
secrecy is generally considered "public use."8 In contrast, a use pursued
primarily for bona fide experimental purposes is merely an "experimental
use."9 Experimental use negates a finding of public use and, therefore,
acts as a counter-defense. 0
Where an accused infringer asserts a public use defense in a jury trial,
two related procedural issues must be addressed. First, who decides
whether the subject invention was in public use prior to the critical
date:" judge or jury? Second, what standard of review applies if the
decision on public use is appealed? Procedural questions involving jury
participation and deference have become a focal point of patent
jurisprudence, 2 particularly because of the dramatic increase in the
number of infringement cases tried by juries over the past few decades. 3
7. Patent infringement falls into two general categories: direct and indirect. Direct infringement is
defined as the unauthorized production, use, sale, offer of sale, or importation into the United States
of a patented invention during the term of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). Indirect
infringement includes actively inducing infringement or selling a specially-designed component for
use in a patented combination or process. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)-(c); Donald A. Chisum &
Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law § 2(E)[2], at 2-215 (1995).
8. See In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333,
336 (1881)); see also James A. Jorgensen, Comment, Environmentally Dependent Inventions and the
"On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars of§ 102(b): A Proffered Solution to a Statutory Dichotomy, 49
U. Miami L. Rev. 185, 199 (1994).
9. See Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887) ("The thing implied as
excepted out of the prohibition of the statute is a use which may be properly characterized as
substantially for purposes of experiment."). Even if a use is nonsecret, as long as it is primarily for
purposes of experimentation, it is considered "experimental." See Smith, 714 F.2d at 1134 (citing
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877)).
10. TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
William C. Rooklidge & Stephen C. Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity and Experimental Use
Negation ofthe Public Use and On Sale Bars to Patentability, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1 (1995).
11. The date one year prior to patent application is commonly called the "critical date" for section
102(b) purposes. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 7, § 2(C)[5][b], at 2-89.
12. See generally Allen N. Littman, The Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases:
Markman, Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207 (1997); Albert W. Preston, Jr. & Dianne B.
Elderkin, Malta v. Schulmerich: The Federal Circuit at a Crossroads in Its Search to Harmonize
Substantive Patent Law with Jury Trial Procedure and Review, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 49 (1992); Gregory
D. Liebold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent Infringement
Litigation, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 623 (1996).
13. See Littman, supra note 12, at 209. Between September 30, 1996 and September 30, 1997,
just over half of all patent cases were tried by juries. See Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Court, Table C4 (visited Sept. 1, 1998)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialbusiness/c04sep97.pdf>.
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Recent decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 4
that have allocated decisionmaking power between judge and jury have
been contentious. 5 These splintered decisions reflect divergent views on
a jury's role in deciding key patent issues. 6 Lough v. Brunswick Corp.7
continues the debate.
In Lough, a divided three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit reversed a
unanimous jury verdict that had found no public use of the patented
invention. ' Although some evidence supported experimental use
negation, the majority claimed that the issues of public use and
experimental use are questions of law, 9 and that the record lacked a
"minimal indicia of experimentation" necessary to uphold the jury's
conclusion.2 According to the court, the inventor's lack of supervision
14. With the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Congress created the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(1994)). Under the Act, the Federal Circuit was granted exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all
patent appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). Because the U.S. Supreme Court rarely hears patent cases,
the Federal Circuit has been described as the court of last resort for patent law. See Thomas K.
Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar. the Doctrine of Equivalents, and
Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1153 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en
banc), aff'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Nies, J., dissenting) ("No more important nor contentious an issue arises in patent law jurisprudence
than the appropriate role ofjuries in patent litigation.") (footnote omitted).
16. Judge Nies, dissenting in In re Lockwood, stated:
That a reasonable jury could have reached the contrary verdict on the record before us and that
verdict would have been accepted under the reasonableness standard is of no consequence. I do
not agree with this treatment of an issue of law. In my view, an issue of law has only one
possible answer on a given record. At a minimum, the decision on the issue must be reviewed to
determine if it is "right" or "wrong," not "reasonable."
50 F.3d at 989. Compare her view with that of the court in Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.: "Jury
verdicts must be treated with great deference .... The court, though it remains ultimately
responsible for upholding the law applicable to the facts found, cannot substitute its view for that of
the jury when to do so would be an effective denial of the right to trial by jury." 722 F.2d 1542, 1546
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
17. 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [Lough I], reh"g denied, 103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997) [Lough
I, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997).
18. Id at 1122-23.
19. Id. at 1120.
20. Id. at 1122. Prior to Lough I, the Federal Circuit had accorded deference to a jury's conclusion
on the issue of public use. See, e.g., Allied Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing directed verdict where reasonable jury could have found that
invention was not in public use); Beachcombers Int'l, Inc. v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31
F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that jury's conclusion on public use was subject to
substantial evidence review); Strouss v. Kraft, Inc., Nos. 88-1190, -1191, 1988 WL 115585 (Fed.
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and control over the alleged testing compelled the conclusion that the
inventor was not experimenting."
This Note argues that the majority in Lough mischaracterized the issue
of experimental use and applied the wrong standard of appellate review
in overturning the jury's verdict. Contrary to the court's holding,
experimental use is a question of fact appropriately decided by a jury and
subject to substantial evidence review on appeal. Consequently, where a
jury decides that an invention was not in public use because of
experimental use negation, the proper issue on appeal is whether a
reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence that any pre-
critical date use was primarily for experimental purposes. An affirmative
answer requires that the appellate court uphold the jury's decision,
regardless of whether the issue of public use is a question of law or a
question of fact.
Part I of this Note reviews the public use statutory bar and the
experimental use doctrine. Part II provides an overview of the standards
of appellate review and the law-fact dichotomy. Part III discusses the
Federal Circuit's decision in Lough. Part IV scrutinizes the court's
classification of public use and criticizes the court's treatment of
experimental use negation. Finally, Part V proposes a bifurcated
approach to reviewing public use/experimental use jury cases and applies
this approach to the facts of Lough.
I. THE PUBLIC USE STATUTORY BAR UNDER35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
A. Conditions of Patentability and Section 102(b)
The Constitution gives Congress authority "[t]o promote the Progress
of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective... Discoveries."22 Pursuant to this
language, Congress has consistently imposed conditions for the
Cir. Nov. 2, 1988) (refusing to overturn denial ofjudgment notwithstanding verdict where jury could
have reasonably concluded from evidence that invention was in public use); Orthokinetics, Inc. v.
Safety Trial Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that directed verdict
granting invalidity as matter of law under public use bar was reversible error where substantial
evidence supported jury's conclusion that invention was not in public use).
21. Lough 1, 86 F.3d at 1122.
22. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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patentability of an invention.' Under the current Patent Act, the
conditions for patentability include utility,24 novelty," and nonob-
viousness. 6 Section 102, which determines the novelty of an invention,
contains a bar to patentability if an invention was in prior public use.
Subsection (b) states that a person is entitled to a patent unless "the
invention was... in public use.., in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States."28
While Congress has provided little guidance as to the meaning of this
provision," an examination of the statute's historical development and
caselaw interpreting its terms provides insight.
B. Historical Overview
Under section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793, an inventor seeking a
patent was required to allege that his invention had not been "known or
used before application. 3 ° In Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted this statute to mean that the invention must
not have been known or used "by the public" before application.3 The
Court held that if an inventor allowed his newly discovered invention to
go into public use or to be publicly sold for use before applying for a
patent, such acquiescence constituted an abandonment32 of the inventor's
23. For example, the first Patent Act required that an invention be sufficiently useful and
important and not previously known or used. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 7, § 2(b)[1], at 2-9.
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(1994).
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
27. Accordingly, some commentators view prior public use as relating to the novelty of an
invention. See Gerald T. Welch, Patent Lmv's Ephemeral Experimental Use Doctrine: Judicial Lip
Service to a Judicial Misnomer or the Experimental Stage Doctrine, 11 U. Tol. L. Rev. 865, 867
(1980) ("A finding of public use prior to the critical date contravenes the novelty of an
invention...."). But see Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 7, § 2(b)[1], at 2-10 (characterizing prior
public use as forfeiture of patent right rather than establishing lack of novelty).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
29. See William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffmann 1H, Reduction to Practice,
Experimental Use, and the "On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars to Patentability, 63 St. John's L. Rev.
1, 7 (1988) (noting that Congress has never defined what constitutes placing invention in public use).
30. Act ofFeb. 21, 1793, ch.ll, § 1, 1 Stat. 318,318-21.
31. 27 U.S. 1, 19(1829).
32. Although prior public use was initially considered an abandonment of the right to a patent,
later cases distinguished between public use as abandonment and public use as a forfeiture of an
inventor's patent rights. See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153
F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946); Pitt v. Hall, 19 F. Cas. 754 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1851). As Judge Learned
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right to a patent and a bar to any claim for infringement.33 The Court
reasoned that the absence of a public use bar would "materially retard the
progress of science and the useful arts" because inventors would be able
to extend their commercial exclusivity in the invention while delaying
public disclosure of their discovery.34
The Patent Act of 1836 codified the holding of Pennock by providing
a defense to infringement based on prior public use or sale.35 Three years
later, Congress added a grace period to the public use bar, whereby a
patent would not be held invalid by reason of public use except if the use
was more than two years prior to patent application.36 In 1939, Congress
shortened this grace period to a single year.37 No significant changes
have been made to the public use bar since the 1939 Patent Act.38
C. Public Use and Experimental Use Negation
Courts have broadly construed the term "public use." In the seminal
case of Egbert v. Lippman, the U.S. Supreme Court held that even a
single hidden use by a person other than the inventor could constitute
public use for purposes of determining patent validity.39 In Egbert, the
inventor allowed a friend to use his patented corset-springs nearly eleven
years prior to patent application.4" Although the friend's prior use was
Hand explained in Metallizing, a use prior to the critical date results in forfeiture, but "such a
forfeiture has nothing to do with abandonment, which presupposes a deliberate, though not
necessarily an express, surrender of any right to a patent." 153 F.2d at 520. Notwithstanding this
distinction, many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, characterized prior public use as a form
of abandonment throughout the nineteenth century. See, e.g., International Tooth-Crown Co. v.
Gaylord, 140 U.S. 55 (1891) (holding that extensive prior public use constituted abandonment of
invention); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 132 (1877) (stating that public use or sale prior
to critical date is conclusive evidence of abandonment). The current Patent Act addresses the issues
of abandonment and public use separately. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994).
33. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23-24.
34. Id. at 19. This concern is unique to the first-to-invent system utilized in the United States. A
first-to-invent system grants patent rights to the first inventor without regard to priority in filing.
Thus, in the absence of a statutory bar, a first inventor has significantly less incentive to file a patent
application promptly and thereby make public disclosure of his or her discovery. See Jorgensen,
supra note 8, at 193 n.40.
35. Act ofJuly4, 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 123.
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 354.
37. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212.
38. See Rooklidge & von Hoffmann, supra note 29, at 6.
39. 104 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1881).
40. Id. at 337.
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hidden from public view, the Court still considered the use an
abandonment under the public use defense.4 The Court opined:
If an inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to another,
to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction,
or injunction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, even
though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to one
person.42
Despite the broad construction of public use, experimental use has
never posed a barrier to the patentability of an invention.43 For example,
in Morris v. Huntington, the Second Circuit Court of New York
considered whether the literal language "not known or used" of the
Patent Act of 1793 barred an inventor from obtaining a patent if the use
was for the purpose of improving the invention." The court instructed
the jury that an inventor should not be prejudiced for allowing an
invention to go into public use "with the view of improving it and
thereby rendering it a greater benefit to the public."4 Later, in Pennock,
Justice Story also intimated that an experimental use would not
invalidate a patent, stating "[i]f it were necessary, as it well might be, to
employ others to assist in the original structure... it can scarcely be
supposed, that the legislature had within its contemplation such
knowledge or use.""
The U.S. Supreme Court squarely held that experimental use
precluded a finding of public use in Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.47 In
Elizabeth, the patentee permitted the public to use his invention, a
wooden pavement, more than six years prior to patent application.48
Although the users were not bound to secrecy, use of the invention was
not per se public use.49 Rather, the Court held that a use for the purposes
41. Id. at 337-38; see also Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90 (1883) (holding that pre-critical date
sale of burglar safes that contained patented conical bolts constituted prior public use and sale of
invention even though bolts were hidden from public view).
42. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336.
43. See Rooklidge & Jensen, supra note 10, at 8-14.
44. 17 F. Cas. 818, 819 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824).
45. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged Morris in Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S.
292,317 (1833).
46. Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829).
47. 97 U.S. 126 (1881).
48. Id. at 136.
49. Id.; see also TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965,972 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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of enabling an inventor to ascertain whether an invention will meet its
intended purpose is merely an "experimental use" and not a public use
within the statute's meaning." Observing that sustained use was
necessary to test the invention's durability, the Court rejected the
accused infringer's public use defense."
D. The Modern Approach to Resolving a Public Use Defense
In TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, the Federal
Circuit set forth the modem framework for resolving an allegation of
public use in an infringement suit." Under TP Labs' framework, a party
asserting a public use defense under section 102(b) must first establish a
prima facie case. 3 Once a prima facie case of public use is established,
the patentee has the burden of coming forward with convincing evidence
to counter the showing." A decision based on the "totality of the
circumstances" is then made as to whether public use has been proven."
The Federal Circuit has identified several factors that are particularly
relevant to resolving a public use defense. 6 Contained in the "totality of
the circumstances test," these factors highlight circumstantial evidence
50. Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135. Ten years later, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed Elizabeth by
holding that a use pursued with a mere incidental purpose of testing and perfecting the invention
would not avoid the public use bar. See Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 266
(1887).
51. Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 136-37.
52. 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 971. Evidence of public use must be clear and convincing. See Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco
Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1197 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
54. TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971. A patentee can counter the showing by introducing evidence of
"negating" experimental use. See Rooklidge & Jensen, supra note 10, at 43.
55. Under the current framework, the dual issues of public use and experimental use have, in
some sense, merged into the single issue of public use. See TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 971 ("It is incorrect
to ask: 'was it public use'? and then, 'was it experimental'? Rather, the court is faced with a single
issue: 'was it public use under § 102(b)?"'). Notwithstanding the "merger" of public use and
experimental use, each issue remains analytically distinct for the purposes of determining scope of
appellate review. As Rooklidge & Jensen recognized prior to the decision in Lough:
If... there are not two separate issues.., the experimental use issue may have been merged
into the legal conclusion of public use or on sale bar. On the other hand, the issue of whether the
intent of the activity was primarily experimental is a distinct issue, one that partakes of the kind
of historical determination that is usually labeled a finding of fact.
Rooklidge & Jensen, supra note 10, at 48-49 (footnote omitted).
56. See Allied Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted).
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relating to both public use and experimental use." On the public use side,
these factors include: Whether there was any confidentiality obligation
imposed on persons who observed the use, the nature of the activity that
occurred in public, whether the public had access to and knowledge of
the use, and whether persons other than the inventor or those acting for
the inventor conducted the experiments. 8 On the experimental use side,
the test incorporates objective indicia suggesting experimental purpose59
such as: whether progress records were kept; the length of the test
period; whether payment was made for the device; and the overall
number of tests conducted.60
The Federal Circuit also advocates a policy-based approach to public
use analysis." Under this approach, the totality of the circumstances is
weighed in light of several policies underlying the public use bar.62 These
policies include: (1) discouraging the removal from the public domain of
inventions the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available,
(2) favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions,
(3) prohibiting the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention
for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed term, and (4) allowing
the inventor a reasonable amount of time to determine the potential
57. See Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198 ("Evidence of experimentation is part of the totality of the
circumstances considered in a public use inquiry.") (emphasis added); see also Edward G. Poplawski
& Paul D. Tripodi II, The Impact of Federal Circuit Precedent on the "On-Sale" and "Public-Use"
Bars to Patentability, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 2351, 2383 (1995) (noting that some factors relating to
public use overlap with factors relating to experimental use negation); Rooklidge & Jensen, supra
note 10, at 44 (noting that experimental use issue appears to have been swallowed up into totality of
circumstances test).
58. See Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574.
59. See Sinskey v. Pharmacia, 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (characterizing factors as
objective evidence of experimental purpose); In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(same).
60. See Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 498.
61. See TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
William C. Rooklidge, The On Sale and Public Use Bars to Patentability: The Policies Reexamined,
1 Fed. Circuit B.J., Winter 1991, at 7, 7-13.




economic value of a patent.63 According to the Federal Circuit, these
policies, in effect, "define" the public use bar.'
II. SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
With the recent rise in the number of patent infringement cases tried
by juries,65 the scope of appellate review applicable to a jury's
conclusion on certain key issues has become increasingly important.
Because the scope of appellate review generally varies with how an issue
falls within the law-fact dichotomy, whether an issue is a question of law
or fact can be pivotal to the outcome of a case. While the law-fact
distinction is availing for many issues, for certain "mixed" issues
classification as a question of law or as a question of fact has turned on a
balance of public policy considerations.
A. Deferential and Plenary Review ofJury Decisions
The intensity with which an appellate court evaluates an assigned
error constitutes the scope of appellate review.66 Typically, the scope of
appellate review depends on the "legal" or "factual" nature of the issue
decided67 and whether a judge or jury was the trial-level decisionmaker."
A jury's conclusion on a question of fact is generally reviewed for
"substantial evidence."69 Under this deferential standard, the jury's
63. Id. (citing King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also
General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The policies were originally
identified in a student Note published in 1972. See Patrick J. Barrett, Note, New Guidelines for
Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 730 (1972).
64. See TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 976.
65. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
66. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/lury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 993 (1986).
67. See Robert L. Stem, Review of Findings ofAdministrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70,72 (1958).
68. See Louis, supra note 66, at 994.
69. See Stem, supra note 67, at 73; see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943)
(rejecting scintilla of evidence standard); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d
707, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A factual finding made by a federal judge is reviewed under the "clearly
erroneous" standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Under this standard, the finding will be set aside if, after
reviewing all evidence, "the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395 (1948)).
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decision will be upheld provided the record taken as a whole contains
such relevant evidence "as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as
adequate to support the finding under review."7 By contrast, if the issue
is a question of law based on underlying facts, the jury's legal conclusion
based on its factual findings must be legally "correct."'" In other words,
the facts properly found must support the verdict in law.72 Because an
appellate court is free to substitute its own view as to the correctness of a
jury's legal conclusion,73 appellate review of a legal conclusion is not
limited by the reasonableness standard applicable to factual findings.74
B. Distinguishing Questions ofLaw from Questions of Fact
Despite the significance of an issue's classification within the law-fact
dichotomy, the process by which courts distinguish questions of law
from questions of fact remains "elusive."75 Consequently, whether an
issue is "legal" or "factual" has been described as merely a synonym for
whether a judge or jury makes the ultimate decision.76 Nevertheless,
aside from the identity of the decisionmaker, two patterns have emerged.
First, issues pertaining to whether a particular event occurred are
generally regarded as questions of fact.77 Second, issues that relate to the
nature of a general rule or standard applicable to many cases are usually
classified as questions of law.78
70. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
71. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
72. Perkin-Elmer, 732 F.2d at 893; Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506,
1513 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
73. Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1513.
74. See Preston & Elderkin, supra note 12, at 52-54.
75. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (citations omitted). The ambiguity stems in part
from a refusal of many courts to provide reasoned analysis when classifying an issue. Id. ("[T]he
decision to label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of fact,' or a 'mixed question of law and
fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.") (citations omitted); see also
Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997)
(Plager, J., dissenting) ("What is needed is functional analysis rather than a priori labeling as 'legal
issue' or 'factual issue."'); Stephan A. Weiner, The CivilJury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54
Cal. L. Rev. 1867, 1868 (1966).
76. See Weiner, supra note 75, at 1868.
77. See Stem, supra note 67, at 93.
78. Id. at94.
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Issues that require the application of a general rule to historical facts
are difficult to classify.79 These "mixed" issues involve elements of both
law and fact and therefore "do not fit nicely" into the law-fact
dichotomy.80 In cases where precedent is unclear, several factors appear
to be relevant in deciding whether a borderline issue should be classified
as a question of law or a question of fact. These factors include the
Seventh Amendment's8' underlying preference fgr jury participation in
the legal process,82 the relative position and ability of each judicial actor
to decide the issue," and the impact of stare decisis on predictability and
uniformity in the law.84
79. Whether a particular defendant committed the tort of negligence provides a useful example of
law application. See Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(A): Rationing and Rationalizing the
Resources of Appellate Review, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 645, 657-58 (1988). Resolution of the issue
requires that the decisionmaker apply the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances to the
historical facts found.
80. See Louis, supra note 66, at 994; see also Cooper, supra note 79, at 660 (noting that
classification of issues involving law application for purposes of identifying standard of appellate
review does not depend on actual status of issue).
81. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall otherwise be re-examined in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. Const. amend. VII.
82. See Weiner, supra note 75, at 1919. If an issue must be decided by a jury to preserve the
substance of the common law right of trial by jury as it existed in 1791, the Seventh Amendment
appears to require that the issue be deemed a question of fact. See id. at 1889-93 (discussing
Burcham v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 209 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1954)).
83. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) ("[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned
on a determination that, as a matter of sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question... '); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984) (suggesting that, in cases where decision on issue requires
decisionmaker to go beyond application of principles of logic and common experience, reviewing
court may have to exercise its own independent judgment); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 289-90 (1960) (reasoning that nontechnical nature of statutory standard and close relationship
of standard to practical human experience supports factual classification of issue).
84. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996); Weiner, supra
note 75, at 1924. In contrast to a case holding, a jury verdict has no precedential value.
Consequently, classifying an issue as a question of fact can reduce predictability and uniformity in
the law. Id.
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III. LOUGH v. BRUNSWICK CORP.
A. Background Facts and Procedural History
While working as a boat technician, Steven Lough invented an
improved upper seal assembly for a marine stem drive." Lough made six
usable prototypes on a metal lathe in the spring of 1986.86 He installed
one of the prototypes in his boat87 and three months later installed a
prototype in each of two boats he regularly maintained.88 Lough gave the
remaining prototypes to his friends.t 9 Without Lough's knowledge, one
of the distributed prototypes was installed on a boat later sold to
strangers." On June 6, 1988, Lough applied for a patent.9' On July 18,
1989, the U.S. Patent and Trademark office approved the application and
issued a patent for Lough's invention.9
Sometime in 1990, Lough sent a letter to a representative of
Brunswick, a major producer of marine stern drives, advising the
company of his patent.93 Brunswick showed interest in Lough's invention
and negotiated with Lough for the purchase of the patent rights, but the
parties did not reach an agreement.94 Brunswick then proceeded to design
and sell a similar upper seal assembly,95 eventually forcing Lough out of
the market.
96
85. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [Lough 1], reh'g
denied, 103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997) [Lough II], cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997). A stem drive
is a marine propulsion device for boats in which the engine is located inside the boat and is coupled
to an outdrive containing a propeller. Id. at 1114. An upper seal assembly prevents sea water and
exhaust from corroding the gear shift cable and user controls located on the stem drive. Id. at 1115.
86. Lough 1, 103 F.3d at 1528. Lough was a backyard hobbyist with a high school education. Id.
at 1123 (Plager, J., dissenting). Lough made the prototypes on his grandfather's lathe after trial and
error. Id.
87. Lough , 86 F.3d at 1116.
88. Lough 11, 103 F.3d at 1528-29. One of the boats was owned by a customer of the marina at
which Lough worked, the other by the marina owner. Id. at 1529.
89. Id. Lough neither asked for nor received any compensation for use of these prototypes, nor did
he attempt to sell his invention during the time preceding his patent application. Lough 1, 86 F.3d at
1117.
90. Id. at 1121.
91. Id. at 1116.
92. Id.
93. Brief of Appellee at 10, Lough I(Nos. 95-1266, -1302, -1314).
94. Id. at 10-11.
95. Lough 1, 86 F.3d at 1117-18.
96. BriefofAppellee at 10-11, Lough I(Nos. 95-1266,-1302,-1314).
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Lough subsequently sued for patent infringement. 7 Alleging that
Lough's invention was in public use prior to the critical date, Brunswick
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.98 Lough
responded that any pre-critical date use was experimental and therefore
not public use under the statute.99 After a seventeen-day trial, a
unanimous jury concluded that Brunswick failed to prove prior public
use, Brunswick infringed Lough's patent, and Lough was entitled to
damages in the amount of $1.5 million.' 0 Brunswick moved for a
judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issue of prior public use.0
The trial court denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of
Lough." 2 Brunswick appealed.0 3
B. The Majority's Analysis in Lough I
Reviewing the trial court's denial of JMOL, the Federal Circuit held
that the issues of public use and experimental use are questions of law."°
Although finding no error in the legal standard applied by the jury,' the
Federal Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of JMOL, stating that
"the jury's determination that Lough's use of the invention was
experimental so as to defeat the assertion of public use was incorrect as a
matter of law."'0 6 The court focused on evidence that Lough did not ask
for any comments regarding the operability of the prototypes and that a
prototype was sold without Lough's knowledge."7
97. Lough 1, 86 F.3d at 1118.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1119.




104. Id. at 1120.
105. Id. at 1123 (Plager, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1122.
107. Id. at 1121. Although the original reported opinion suggested that Lough did not receive
feedback on the performance of the prototypes, that opinion was later amended. See Erratum in
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C. Lough II
Following the three-judge panel's disposition of the case, Lough filed
a combined petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en
banc. '8 The Federal Circuit denied Lough's petition with several judges
filing separate opinions.'0 9 Concurring in the order denying rehearing,
Judge Lourie.. defended the characterization of public use and
experimental use as questions of law.'" Emphasizing that "public use" is
a statutory term, Judge Lourie reasoned that the ultimate determination
on the issue of public use requires more than simply ascertaining
historical fact."2 Rather, a determination requires the facts be weighed in
light of the statute's underlying policies.' Judge Michel also argued in
favor of classifying public use as a question of law, asserting that plenary
review would promote predictability and thereby discourage litigation."'
With respect to experimental use, Judge Lourie claimed that a judge
should decide the issue without deference to a jury because the term
"experimental use" is judge-made.' ' Furthermore, because experimental
use is on the "same conceptual level as public use," it requires
consideration of the underlying policies of section 102(b) and is
appropriately decided by a judge."
6
IV. ALTHOUGH PUBLIC USE MAY BE A QUESTION OF LAW,
EXPERIMENTAL USE IS A QUESTION OF FACT
The outcome of Lough turned on the majority's classification of both
public use and experimental use as questions of law." 7 A close
inspection of precedent and the factors surrounding classification of an
108. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997) [Lough I1], cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 43 (1997).
109. Id. Four judges filed dissenting opinions.
110. Judge Lourie wrote the majority opinion in Lough L
111. Lough II, 103 F.3d at 1518-19 (Lourie, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1518.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1526-27 (Michel, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1518 (Lourie, J., concurring).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1529 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("The outcome of Lough turns on the standard of review
applied by this court.").
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issue within the law-fact dichotomy undermines the majority's
conclusion.
A. The Classification of Public Use as a Question of Law Is Debatable
United States Supreme Court precedent is unclear as to whether the
issue of prior public use is a question of law or a question of fact. On one
hand, several older cases suggest that the ultimate decision is factual and
should be made by a jury."8 For example, in Pennock & Sellers v.
Dialogue, Justice Story stated that whether an inventor's acts provide
satisfactory proof of public use is usually a question of fact rather than
law." 9 In a later case involving the issue of public use, the Court opined:
The real interest of an inventor with respect to an assertion or
surrender of his rights under the Constitution and laws of the
United States... is an inquiry or conclusion offact, and peculiarly
within the province of the jury, guided by the legal evidence
submitted to them at the trial.
20
On the other hand, U.S. Supreme Court cases also suggest that public
use is ultimately a question of law.12 ' For example, Justice Story
concluded in Pennock that "when all the facts are given, there does not
seem any reason why the court may not state the legal conclusion
deducible from them."' Furthermore, in the more recent case of
Graham v. John Deere Co., the Court held that the ultimate conclusion
on patent validity is a question of law. 23 Because patent validity turns, in
part, on whether the invention was in public use, the ultimate conclusion
on public use may be a subsidiary question of law under Graham.
24
118. See, e.g., Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 331 (1858); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 484
(1850); Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 16 (1829).
119. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16.
120. Kendall, 62 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Gayler, the U.S. Supreme Court
approved a jury charge that stated that the inventor's patent should be found valid unless "the
plaintiff or those under whom he claimed, had abandoned said improvement to the public, and
suffered the same to go into public use before the application for said patent, of which facts the
jurors were the judges." Gayler, 51 U.S. at 484.
121. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16.
122. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16.
123. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (citing Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 155 (1950)).
124. At least one Federal Circuit decision appears to have adopted this reasoning. See Paragon
Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1186 (1993) (citing Graham as basis for
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In the absence of clear precedent, consideration of the factors
discussed in Part II.B is necessary to determine the proper classification
of public use."z A comparison of the relative abilities of each judicial
actor tends to favor classifying public use as a question of law. The
Federal Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the underlying policies of
section 102(b) define "public use" and has steadfastly refused to adopt
rigid standards.126 In light of this policy-based approach, judges may
have a comparative advantage over juries in ultimately deciding whether
a particular invention was in public use.
1 27
Aside from the comparative abilities of judge and jury, however, the
remaining factors support designating public use as a question of fact.
First, because juries decide factual issues, the Seventh Amendment's
underlying policy of jury participation in the legal process clearly favors
classifying public use as a question of fact. 21 Second, the multitude of
circumstances that can arise in public use cases 129 makes it unlikely that
the application of stare decisis will result in any more certainty than if
the issue of public use were left to a jury. 3' The classification of public
classifying related section 102(b) bar as question of law). The scope of Graham, however, is unclear.
For instance, the issue of anticipation, which also affects patent validity, remains a question of fact
notwithstanding Graham. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1151 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
125. These factors include: (1) the Seventh Amendment's preference for jury participation and
deference, (2) the comparative position and ability of each judicial actor to decide the issue, and (3)
the impact of stare decisis on uniformity and predictability in the law. See supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
126. Westem Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844 (1985) (noting that
section 102(b) analysis is wholly unsuited to mechanically-applied, technical rules especially given
policy-based approach to adjudication). At least one commentator is critical of the Federal Circuit's
refusal to articulate defined rules for 102(b) cases. See Landry, supra note 14, at 1169.
127. On the other hand, there is little evidence that judges are actively making policy judgments
when deciding public use cases. In fact, commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit for failing
to provide a policy-based analysis when deciding public use cases. See, e.g., Jorgensen, supra note 8,
at 225 ("The court, in practice, tends to recite the stated policies and then determine, in a rather
conclusory fashion, that the policies have been violated by a given sale or use without providing
further policy-based analyses.") (footnote omitted); Rooklidge & Jensen, supra note 10, at 6 ("While
others have analyzed these policies at length, the Federal Circuit has never paid them more than
mere lip service.").
128. Whether the Seventh Amendment requires that juries decide the issue of public use is
beyond the scope of this Note. Surprisingly, the Federal Circuit does not mention the Seventh
Amendment in either Lough Ior Lough I1.
129. See Western Marine, 764 F.2d at 844 (noting that section 102(b) analysis encompasses
infinite variety of factual situations).
130. See Weiner, supra note 75, at 1926. Professor Weiner states:
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use as a question of law is, therefore, unlikely to improve predictability
or reduce litigation. In fact, because errors of law are subject to a more
searching review, classifying public use as a question of law may
actually encourage appeal and thereby increase litigation.
3'
B. Experimental Use Is a Question ofFact
Regardless of whether public use is properly classified as a question
of law, the legal or factual classification of experimental use remains
integral to appellate review of a public use defense. Because
experimental use negates public use as a matter of law, 32 a court must
necessarily decide that an invention was not in experimental use to
decide that the invention was in public use.'33 In other words, a court's
reversal of a jury's conclusion that an invention was not in public use
will necessarily overturn a jury's decision that the patentee's invention
was in experimental use. The propriety of overturning a jury's
conclusion on experimental use depends on the amount of deference that
should be accorded to the jury's decision on that issue. The amount of
deference on experimental use, in turn, depends on the classification of
experimental use within the law-fact dichotomy.'34
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, precedent
supports the factual classification of experimental use. Prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit, most U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
[I]n the resolution of the inevitable conflict between the desire for uniformity and predictability
and the policy favoring trial by jury, the first controlling factor should be the likelihood of
recurrence of the historical fact pattern to which the law is being applied in a given case.... [I]f
it is recognized that the outcome of a particular example of law application turns upon events
which will probably never recur in precisely the same way, there will be little sacrifice in
certainty and predictability by permitting the jury rather than the judge to make the application.
Id.; see also Robert D. Fram & Sarah Elizabeth Mitchell, Federal Circuit Sees Fit to Streamline
Litigation (visited Sept. 1, 1998) <http://www.hevm.com/search/art.shtml?id=213&parea=BA>
(questioning whether Federal Circuit's recent classification of certain patent issues as questions of
law will lead to improved predictability given that various panels of Federal Circuit are equally as
unpredictable as juries).
131. See Weiner, supra note 75, at 1922; see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (observing that plenary review of patent claim
construction has led to high reversal rate thereby diminishing likelihood of out-of-court settlements).
132. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [Lough I], reh g denied,
103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997) [Lough 11], cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997).
133. Apparently, this is what Judge Lourie meant when he stated that experimental use is on the
same "conceptual level" as public use. See supra text accompanying note 116.
134. See supra Part ll.A.
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expressly or implicitly concluded that experimental use is a question of
fact. 3 ' Likewise, the Federal Circuit has treated experimental use as a
factual issue that a jury should decide, despite its classification of public
use as a question of law.'36 Furthermore, because experimental use turns
on an inventor's intent,'37 and issues that turn on intent are typically
classified as questions of fact,'38 the classification of experimental use as
an issue of law is anomalous.
135. For example, in Del Mar Engineering Laboratories v. Physio-Tronics, Inc., the court held:
Whether a public use is for the purpose of exploiting an invention or whether it is a bona fide
experimental use turns largely on the intent or motivation of the inventor. As such it is a
question of fact to be determined by the trial court and we will reverse the trial judge's
determination only if it is clearly erroneous.
642 F.2d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); see also Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings,
Inc., 562 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1977) (reviewing district court's conclusion on experimental use
issue under clearly erroneous standard); In re Yam, 498 F.2d 271, 285 (5th Cir. 1974) ("It must be
stressed, however, that the experimental use issue is a question not of legal relations but of fact,
depending as it does, on the inventor's state of mind.") (citations omitted); Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-
Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 1973) (reviewing district court's conclusion on experimental
use issue under clearly erroneous standard); Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 390
(7th Cir. 1967) (same); McCullough Tool Co. v. Will Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 394 (10th Cir.
1965) ("The issue of whether a use of the device is experimental or public is one of fact."); Ezee
Stone Cutter Mfg. v. Southwest Indus. Prods., 262 F.2d 183, 186 (8th Cir. 1958) (characterizing trial
court's finding on issue of experimental use as finding of fact); General Elec. Co. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 118 F.2d 278, 279 (2d Cir. 1941) ("But whether the uses were public or
experimental was question of fact.'). Although the Federal Circuit is not bound by these decisions,
the nearly uniform treatment of experimental use as a question of fact is at least persuasive authority.
136. See, e.g., Strouss v. Kraft, Inc., Nos. 88-1190, -1191, 1988 WL 115585, at **1 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 2, 1988) ("The evidence of the length of testing period and extensiveness of the testing could
well have been considered by the jury as beyond reasonable experimentation."); Baker Oil Tools,
Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The disputed factual issue of
experimental purpose was material to the decision.") (citations omitted); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("We note that Orthokinetics did come
forward with evidence of an experimental purpose sufficient to have convinced the jury that even the
possibility of a public use bar had been 'negated.").
137. See Lough If, 103 F.3d at 1513 (Rader J., dissenting) (citing Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97
U.S. 126, 135 (1877)); Rooklidge & Jensen, supra note 10, at 33 ("Given that the primary inquiry
regarding experimental use negation is the purpose of the activity, intent is not only material, it is
controlling.") (emphasis in original); Henry R. Veenstra, The Availability of the Experimental Use
Exception as a Stay of the On Sale or Public Use Bar in 102(b) Depends on the Intent of the
Inventor: In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 24 Drake L. Rev. 718, 721 (1975)
("Whether the use of an invention is for experimental purposes depends upon the good faith intent of
the inventor.") (footnote omitted). But see Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KIM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d
1182, 1186 (Fed Cir. 1993) (suggesting inventor's intent is not determinative of experimental use).
138. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. United Steel Workers, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (intent to
discriminate); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (donative intent); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949) (intent to restrain trade). But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (malice in First Amendment case). As Professor Weiner notes:
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The factors discussed in Part II.B also support the classification of
experimental use as a question of fact. 39 Perhaps the most compelling
support is found in a comparison of the relative abilities of each judicial
actor to decide the issue. Whether a particular use of an invention was
pursued primarily for bona fide experimental purposes is entirely fact-
driven. Thus, unlike the issue of public use, the resolution of
experimental use does not require an ad hoc balancing of the underlying
policies of section 102(b). 4' Moreover, because experimental purpose is
nontechnical and decided with reference to practical human experience,
experimental use is well-suited to adjudication by a jury.
1 41
As the trier of fact, a jury is also better positioned than an appellate
court to evaluate evidence of experimental use. 42 For example, when an
inventor testifies that the primary intent of a pre-critical date use was to
experiment, the inventor's demeanor becomes germane to the probative
value of the testimony. Because appellate court judges do not have
access to demeanor evidence, they are substantially limited in their
ability to evaluate direct evidence of experimental use.'43 Accordingly,
What a person intended, knew or believed is a question of fact. Since only the person himself is
in a position to give direct evidence of his subjective thought processes at a given moment, and
since his testimony may be accorded only limited weight, the jury may have to draw inferences
from what he said and did. There is agreement that such inference drawing constitutes fact-
finding.
Weiner, supra note 75, at 1870 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). That a question of intent is
encompassed within a patent case does not alter its factual classification. See, e.g., Kangaroos
U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that good faith and intent
to deceive are questions of fact in patent cases involving inequitable conduct).
139. These factors include: (1) the Seventh Amendment's preference for jury participation and
deference, (2) the comparative position and ability of each judicial actor to decide the issue, and
(3) the impact of stare decisis on uniformity and predictability in law. See supra notes 82-S4 and
accompanying text.
140. See Rooklidge & Jensen, supra note 10, at 24 ("Whether an activity is experimental has
nothing whatsoever to do with whether the activity violates any of the other policies underlying the
bars.").
141. Cf. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289 (reasoning that nontechnical nature of statutory standard and
close relationship of standard to practical human experience supports factual classification of issue).
142. See Lough H1, 103 F.3d at 1534 n.9 (Rader, J., dissenting).
143. Possibly for this reason, the Federal Circuit has downplayed the significance of an inventor's
testimony on the issue of experimental use. For example, in Lough I, the court states that "the
expression by an inventor of his subjective intent to experiment, particularly after institution of
litigation, is generally of minimal value." Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
1996) [Lough I] (citing TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir.
1984)), reh'g denied, 103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997) [Lough II], cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997).
Compare this language with that stated in Robbins Co. v. Lmvrence Manufacturing, "An inventor's
testimony of his subjective intent has no probative force against ovenvhelming evidence to the
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their ability to decide experimental use on appeal is materially
diminished.'"
Both of Judge Lourie's arguments for classifying experimental use as
a question of law are unpersuasive.'45 First, the fact that experimental use
negates public use does not convert experimental use into a legal issue.'46
The relationship between public use and experimental use simply does
not alter the entirely historical nature of the experimental use inquiry.
Second, Judge Lourie's emphasis on the fact that "experimental use" is a
judge-made term47 is misplaced. Whether a term was coined by a judge
or legislator has little to do with the legal or factual nature of the
underlying issue.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH FOR REVIEWING SECTION 102(b)
PUBLIC USE CASES INVOLVING THE EXPERIMENTAL USE
COUNTER-DEFENSE
Although only marginally supported, 48  the Federal Circuit's
classification of public use as a "legal conclusion" appears to be firmly
entrenched."94 The crucial question, therefore, is how to accommodate
the factual treatment of experimental use within the Federal Circuit's
current paradigm. 5 '
contrary." 482 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). Interestingly, Robbins is the original
source for the Lough I citation. See In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing
Robbins); TP Lab., 724 F.2d at 972 (citing Smith). Notwithstanding the view expressed in Lough I,
an inventor's testimony can be crucial to determining whether an invention was in experimental use.
See Moxness Prods., Inc. v. Xomed, Inc., 891 F.2d 890 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that district court
erred in granting JNOV on issue of public use where court failed to attribute weight to co-inventor's
testimony regarding experimental purpose).
144. Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) ("When ... the issue involves the credibility
of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and
familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court and according
its determinations presumptive weight.").
145. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
146. See Lough I, 86 F.3d at 1518 (Lourie, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. See supra Part IV.A.
149. See, e.g., Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Baxter
Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Lab. Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
150. For a recent discussion of the importance of distinguishing the "legal" and "factual" elements
of an issue, and applying a deferential standard of review to the latter, see Cybor Corp. v. FAS




A. Separating Public Use and Experimental Use
To preserve the "legal" treatment of public use while ensuring that the
proper amount of deference is accorded to the jury on the "factual" issue
of experimental use, courts should apply a two-pronged analysis. First,
the court should independently determine whether the evidence presented
at trial established a prima facie case of public use in light of the
underlying policies of section 102(b). This determination should be made
without regard to evidence of experimental purpose. Second, the court
should determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's
conclusion on the issue of experimental use.' In cases where substantial
evidence supports a finding of experimentation, a jury verdict finding no
public use is legally "correct' 5 2 and should be upheld accordingly. Had
the Lough court applied this analysis, the trial court's denial of
Brunswick's motion for JMOL would have been sustained.
B. The Facts of Lough Revisited
Applying the proposed approach to Lough, the dispositive issue on
appeal was whether a reasonable jury could have found from the
evidence that Lough's pre-critical date use was substantially for purposes
of experimentation.'53 Because the evidence presented met this threshold,
the decision to overturn the jury's conclusion constituted an unwarranted
intrusion into the jury's fact-finding province.'54
A reasonable jury could have found that Lough's pre-critical date use
was experimental given the following evidence. First, Lough neither
received, nor requested, payment for the use of his invention.'55 Second,
several witnesses testified that they were aware that the prototypes were
being evaluated.'56 Third, an owner of one of the boats containing a
151. Trial courts can facilitate this review by requiring that juries execute special interrogatories
documenting their conclusion on experimental use. See Fed. t. Civ. P. 49(b).
152. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
153. Lough essentially admitted that his pre-critical date, nonsecret use was prima facie public
use. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
154. While the jury in Lough did not expressly find that Lough's pre-critical date use was
experimental, on appeal, the Federal Circuit must presume the existence of findings necessary to
support the jury's verdict. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
155. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
156. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1997) [Lough II] (Newman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997).
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prototype testified that he and Lough regularly checked the seal on his
boat for performance and durability.'57 Fourth, Lough only distributed
prototypes to persons who had the ability to test the invention.'58 Fifth,
Lough testified, under oath, that he distributed the prototypes for the
purpose of evaluating performance and durability in varied conditions. 5 9
Finally, Lough's lack of testing facilities and relatively small number of
prototypes makes informal experimentation with minimal oversight
plausible.
Notwithstanding the evidence described above, the Lough majority
implies that a finding of experimental use could not be supported by
substantial evidence because Lough did not directly supervise the pre-
critical date use. 6 Contrary to the majority's view, however, direct
inventor supervision is not always required for a finding of experimentation.
For example, in Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products
Co., the patentee shipped several samples of the invention to clients prior
to the critical date. 6' Noting that it was industry custom to ship samples
to clients to ensure product utility, the Federal Circuit held that the
client's subsequent use of the invention was experimental. 62 The court
found nothing inconsistent with experimentation, even in the apparent
absence of direct inventor supervision 63
The Lough majority also suggests that a finding of experimental use
was incorrect because Lough did not ask for feedback regarding the
performance of his prototypes." 4 But the fact that Lough did not ask for
157. Id. at 1523.
158. Lough's seal assembly was designed for use with MerCruiser stem drives. See Brief of
Appellee at 36, Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-1266, -1302,
-1314). Three of the five recipients owned boats with that particular brand of stem drive. Id. at 5.
The other two, Lough's longtime friends, worked at a Florida marina. Id. Lough gave them the
prototypes with the understanding that "they would install them in boats with the troublesome seal
problem in order to test them and determine if they worked." Id.
159. See Lough 11, 103 F.3d at 1521.
160. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [Lough I] ("Accepting the
jury found these facts.., it cannot reasonably be disputed that Lough's use of the invention was not
'experimental' so as to negate a conclusion of public use."), reh 'g denied, 103 F.3d 1515 (Fed. Cir.
1997). cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 43 (1997).
161. 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
162. Id. at 906.
163. Id.; see also Armco, Inc. v. Cyclops Corp., 791 F.2d 147 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that pre-
critical date, unsupervised use of invention by noninventors did not preclude finding of experimental
use).
164. Lough 1, 86 F.3d at 1121
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feedback from some users does not preclude a reasonable jury from
finding experimental purpose. As discussed in Lough's appellate brief,
users understood that they were to notify Lough if a prototype failed.65
This arrangement, which is consistent with informal experimentation,
eliminated the need for Lough to contact each and every user as to the
operability of the prototypes.
Finally, Lough's alleged lack of control over the pre-critical date use
should not be determinative of whether his invention was in public or
experimental use.'66 Even though a prototype was installed on a boat later
sold to strangers, the subsequent use and disposal of that single prototype
is hardly "public use" given the minimal risk posed to the underlying
policies of section 102(b). 67 Moreover, imposing a requirement of
absolute control over the pre-critical date use of a prototype would
unfairly prejudice less sophisticated inventors who typically lack both
testing facilities'68 and knowledge of the public use bar. 69
165. See Brief of Appellee at 40, Lough I(Nos. 95-1266, -1302, -1314).
166. Whether Lough had control over the use of the prototypes is unclear in light of several
Federal Circuit decisions. See, e.g., Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that use by noninventor was under control of inventor by virtue of personal
relationship and other surrounding circumstances); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.,
724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that control was established inherently by professional
relationship between inventor and party in possession of invention). But see Beachcombers Int'l, Inc.
v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding jury
determination that inventor did not sufficiently control pre-critical date use despite personal
relationship between inventor and users).
167. The only policy even remotely jeopardized by the post-sale use is the policy discouraging the
removal from the public domain of inventions the public reasonably has come to believe are freely
available. However, given that Lough's invention was hidden from public view while in use, it is
extremely unlikely that the public had come to rely on the free use of Lough's invention. See Brief of
Appellee at 37, Lough I (Nos. 95-1266, -1302, -1314); cf Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (downplaying need to advise public of experimental nature
of pre-critical date use where public unlikely to have access to such use). In fact, Brunswick did not
even leam of the invention until several years after the alleged public use occurred. See Brief of
Appellee at 10, Lough I (Nos. 95-1266, -1302, -1314). Furthermore, courts faced with similar facts
have held such use to be experimental. See, e.g., Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(holding that shim installed in inventor's automobile later sold to stranger was in experimental use
although inventor made no attempt to contact new owner to check performance); Goodwin v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 157 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1946) (holding that clutch plate installed in automobile of third
party was in experimental use despite fact that automobile was later sold to stranger without
knowledge of inventor). But see In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (invalidating patent
under public use bar on virtually identical facts as those in Watson).
168. Cf Cali v. Eastern Airlines, 442 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1971) ("IT]he absence of any control by
[the inventor], or any attempt to impose control, should not be elevated to the status of a per se test
under the circumstances disclosed here .... [The inventor] lacked the means to develop his idea on
his own resources."); see also Note, The Public Use Bar to Patentability: Two New Approaches to
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VI. CONCLUSION
Lough illustrates the Federal Circuit's willingness to nullify jury
decisions on important patent issues by manipulating the law-fact
distinction to circumvent deferential standards of review. The Federal
Circuit's supporting rationale, at least insofar as it relates to the issue of
experimental use, is untenable. First, persuasive authority supports the
factual classification of experimental use in that most appellate courts
classified experimental use as a question of fact prior to the creation of
the Federal Circuit. Second, the Federal Circuit has itself treated
experimental use as a question of fact prior to Lough. Third, issues like
experimental use that turn on intent are almost uniformly classified as
issues of fact. Fourth, the nontechnical nature of experimental use makes
the issue well-suited to adjudication by a jury as the trier of fact. Finally,
the Federal Circuit's inability to evaluate demeanor evidence undermines
the court's capacity to decide experimental use on appeal.
Had the Federal Circuit correctly recognized the factual nature of
experimental use and applied a deferential standard of review, the jury's
conclusion on experimental use would have been upheld. More
importantly, because experimental use negates public use as a matter of
law, the Federal Circuit would have been compelled to uphold the jury's
conclusion on the issue of public use as well. The Federal Circuit's
decision to avoid this result by classifying experimental use as a question
of law gratuitously erodes the jury's fact-finding role in the adjudication
of patent infringement suits.
the Experimental Use Exception, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 851, 855-56 (1968) (noting that stringent control
requirement penalizes those inventors who lack testing facilities).
169. The dissenting opinion in Lough I states:
This is not a contest between... the two big competitors in this field, to see who can market a
better engine. If it were, we could expect the combination of engineering and legal staffs on
each side to be punctilious about observing the niceties of our prior opinions on how to conduct
experiments so as to avoid any possible running afoul of the public use bar.
86 F.3d at 1123 (Plager, J., dissenting); see also Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses,
Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 667, 669 (1997) ("[The public use] bar can be
devastating to university researchers who routinely.., discuss their research results without even
knowing such a bar exists until its too late.").
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